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Abstract
From 1990 to 2012, Rita Crundwell committed the largest municipal embezzlement in U.S. history, stealing
more than $53 million from the city of Dixon, Illinois. As city comptroller and treasurer, she secretly opened a 
bank account in the name of Dixon that only she controlled. Crundwell transferred money from city bank accounts
into her illegitimate account, concealing the movement through fictitious invoices she submitted to the city. She used
the money to finance a lavish lifestyle that included multiple residences, numerous vehicles, jewelry, and multiple
horse-farming operations for her championship show horses. After another city employee accidentally discovered 
the secret account, Crundwell admitted her guilt and received a 20-year sentence. Crundwell’s fraud was 
alarming, audacious, and attention-getting — enough to be the subject of television episodes (such as CNBC’s 
American Greed and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s The Fifth Estate) and a documentary movie (All 
the Queen’s Horses). However, it was not an isolated event. Occupational fraud in government is such a common 
occurrence that it should be a major concern to all government organizations and constituents.
Daigle, R., Morris, P., & McSwain, D. (2017). Public Servants "Serving" Themselves: Occupational Fraud In 
Government. Internal Auditing, September/October 2017. 5-14. NC Docks permission to re-print granted by 
author(s). 
F
rom 1 9 9 0 to 2 0 1 2 , R it a
Cr u ndwel l com mit te d t he
largest municipal embezzle-
ment in U.S. histor y, stealing
more than $53 mil l ion from
the city of Dixon, Illinois.1 As city comp-
troller and treasurer, she secretly opened
a bank account in the name of Dixon that
only she control led. Crundwel l trans-
ferred money from city bank accounts
into her illegitimate account, concealing
t he movement t hrou g h f ic t i t iou s in -
voices she submitted to the city. She used
the money to finance a lavish lifest yle
that included multiple residences, num-
erou s vehicles , j ewel r y, and mu lt iple
horse-farming operations for her cham-
pionship show horses. After another city
employee accident a l ly discovered the
secret account, Crundwell admitted her
guilt and received a 20-year sentence.
Crundwell’s fraud was alarming, auda-
cious, and attention-gett ing — enough
to be the subject of telev ision episodes
(such as CNBC’s Amer ican Greed and
the C anadian Bro adcast ing Cor por a-
t ion’s The Fifth Estate) and a documen-
t a r y m ov i e ( Al l t h e Q u e e n’s Ho r s e s ) .
However, it was not an isolated event.
Occup at iona l f r aud in gover nment is
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.
This ar t icle assists internal auditors in better understanding
occupational fraud and how it is commonly committed in government.
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such a common occurrence that it should
be a major concern to al l government
organizat ions and const ituents.
According to the Association of Cer-
t i f ied Fr aud Examiners (ACFE), gov-
ernment and public administration ranks
second to banking and financial services
as the industr y most victimized by occu-
pational fraud.2 The ACFE notes that 18.7
percent of the 2,410 occupational fraud
cases reported in a sur vey of cert ified
fraud examiners (CFEs) occurred in gov-
ernment, with a median loss of $109,000.
This industr y ranking is consistent w ith
that reported by PricewaterhouseCoop-
ers (PwC) as well. Based on survey results
g at h e re d f rom 6 , 3 3 7 re s p on d e nt s i n
finance, executive management, audit,
compliance, and risk management, PwC
reports that government/state-owned is
second to financial services as the indus-
tr y most susceptible to economic crime.3
Marque t Inter nat iona l re i ter ate s t h is
when ranking government entity second
to f i n a nc i a l s e r v i ce s i n f re qu e nc y of
embezzlement cases by industr y.4
Such findings emphasize a matter noted
by a KPMG survey. Of those respondents
i n t he gove r n me nt a nd publ ic s e c tor
indust r y, 79 percent eit her had “per-
sonally seen” or had “first-hand knowl-
e d ge” of m is conduc t , w h ich i nclude s
occupational fraud. 5 To make this mat-
ter even more disconcer t ing, 62 percent
of the respondents perceived that the
misconduct seen or know n could cause
a “significant loss of public trust if dis-
covered.” These grave concerns are obvi-
ously borne out by cases such as Rita
Crundwell’s and others.
This article assists internal auditors in
better understanding occupational fraud
and how it is commonly committed in gov-
ernment. We also highlight actual cases
t h at s e r ve a s e x a mp l e s , s u c h a s R i t a
Crundwell’s. We provide suggestions for
prevent ing and detect ing the schemes
discussed. Our goal is to aid inter nal
auditors in helping government organi-
zations reduce their risk of occupational
fraud so that they can combat the ver y
real threat of public ser vants (i.e., gov-
ernment employees) “serving” themselves
(i.e., committ ing fraud) at the expense
of const ituents.
Occupational fraud schemes in
government: Let me count the ways
The biannual ACFE Report to the Nations
on Occupational Fraud and Abuse provides
excel lent insight into the most common
fraud schemes committed by employees
in many industr ies, including govern-
ment. The ACFE published its first report
in 1996 and has published it ever y two
years since 2002. Sur vey results are quite
consistent across the years. The clear
implicat ion is that occupational fraud
has been and continues to be a substantial
problem in government as well as private
organiz at ions . T his cont inu ance a ls o
means it is imperative that internal audi-
tors understand occupational fraud in gov-
ernment and act to reduce its presence
and cost.
The 2016 ACFE Report defines occu-
pational fraud as “the use of one’s occu-
pation for personal enrichment through
the deliberate misuse or misapplication
of the employing organizations resources
or assets.” In other words, occupational
fraud occurs when an employee steals or
commits abuse at the employer’s expense.
Occupational fraud is often referred to
as “insider fraud” because people inside
an organization perpetrate it. Exhibit 1
lists the top 10 schemes and their respec-
EXHIBIT 1 Top 10 Occupational Fraud Schemes in the
Government and Public Administration Industry
Scheme Percentage
1. Corrupt ion 38.4%
2. Bi l l ing 25.3%
3. Expense Reimbursement 15.7%
4. Non-Cash 14.8%
5. Skimming 14.0%
6. Payrol l 13.5%
7. Cash on Hand 10.5%
8. Check Tamper ing 9.2%
9. Cash Larceny 7.9%
10. Financial Statement Fraud 7.9%
Data source: “Repor t to the nations on occupational
fraud and abuse,” Associat ion of Cer t i f ied Fraud Exam-
iners (2016). Avai lable at: https:/ /www.acfe.com/
r t tn2016/docs/2016-repor t- to-the-nat ions.pdf.
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tive frequencies of occurrence in the gov-
ernment and public administration indus-
tr y, per the 2016 ACFE Report .6
Note that the sum of percentages in
Exhibit 1 (157.2 percent) far exceeds 100
percent. This is not an error but an insight
into the t y pical commission of occupa-
t ional fraud. The sum shows that many
fraudsters perpetrate mult iple schemes
simultaneously. Internal auditors should
keep this insight in mind when invest i-
gat ing suspected fraud. Like an iceberg
where only the tip can be seen above the
water line, an invest igat ion of a “small”
fraud may lead to the discover y of the
larger nature of the fraud hidden below
the surface (i.e. , deep in an organiza-
t ion’s operat ions and records).
Corruption, billing, and expense
reimbursement schemes
The most common occupational fraud
s che me i n gove r n me nt i s cor r upt i on .
Employees committing this scheme abuse
their influence over business transactions
for personal benefit at the employer’s
expense. Corruption includes briber y,
kickbacks, and conflicts of interest. For-
mer Mississippi state legislator Irb Ben-
j a m i n a nd for me r s t ate cor re c t ions
commissioner Chr istopher Epps were
both recently found guilty of corruption.7
Benjamin bribed Epps for support of cer-
tain jails (including prisoner placements,
thereby increasing prison funding) that
Benjamin helped develop. Epps was also
bribed for drug and alcohol rehabilitation
programs that Benjamin’s company ran
at certain inmate work centers (a con-
flict of interest personally enriching Ben-
jamin, and likely at the state’s expense
through inflated costs). In total , Ben-
jamin paid Epps between $180,000 and
$225,000. Benjamin has been sentenced
to 70 months in prison, a fine of $100,000,
and forfeiture of $260,782. Epps faces up
to 23 years in prison.
A n o t h e r e x a mp l e of c o r r u p t i o n
involves trustee Larr y Marshal l of the
Houston Independent School Distr ic t
in Texas. Gil Ramirez successful ly sued
Marshall and other co-defendants, includ-
ing competitors, who conspired to award
construction contracts.8 A federal court
jur y agreed with Ramirez’s assertion that
“i f you w e re n’t w i l l i n g t o h a n d ove r
bribes…you could count on losing out
on construction contracts with the school
d is t r ic t .” R a m i rez w as aw arde d more
than $4 million, w ith Marshall ordered
to pay approximately $2.1 mil lion. 9
The second most common occupa-
t ional f raud scheme in gover nment is
the billing scheme. An employee may per-
p e t r ate t h is s cheme by de ce iv i ng t he
employer into making pay ment on fic-
t it ious goods or ser vices to a false ven-
d o r ( a “s h e l l c o mp a ny ” ) u n d e r t h e
employee’s control. As a variation, the shell
company may provide actual goods or ser-
vices to the employer at an inflated cost.
As another variat ion, the employer may
directly pay a vendor for an employee’s
personal items. In each of these situations,
the employee deceives the employer into
making a disbursement to either a false
vendor under the control of the employee
or a vendor w ith the employee benefit-
ing at the expense of the employer.
This is the scheme perpetrated by Rita
Crundwell, who transferred money from
legitimate city bank accounts to the il le-
git imate city account that only she con-
t rol l e d . S h e cove re d up h e r t h e f t by
creating false invoices for the transfers.
Another example of this scheme is seen
in the case of Brandi Moody, a former
employee in Michigan State University’s
College of Osteopathic Medicine.10 Moody
embezzled nearly $150,000 by making
personal purchases, including gift cards
a n d compute r te ch n ol o g y, w i t h h e r
department-issued credit card paid for
by the universit y. Moody received five
years of probation and avoided further
prison time by making restitution.11
The third most common occupational
fraud scheme in government is expense reim-
bursement . Like a bil ling scheme,
an expense reimbursement scheme
involves an employee deceiving the
employer into making a fraudulent
disbursement. In this scheme, how-
ever, the disbursements are made
directly to the employee for fictit ious or
inflated business expenses. An example
of this scheme is present in the case of Chris-
tine King, former city clerk in Masonville,
Iowa.12 King issued herself expense reim-
.
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bursement checks for nonexistent expenses
she claimed to have incurred on behalf of
the city. Her case also illustrates the point
that fraudsters of ten commit mult iple
schemes when defrauding their employ-
ers. For instance, King also issued herself
fraudulent payroll checks (see #6 in Exhibit
1) and misrepor ted bank account bal-
ances on financia l repor ts to the cit y
council and Auditor for the State of Iowa
(see #10 in Exhibit 1) as a means of cov-
ering up her fraud. King received a 21-
month sentence and was ordered to make
restitution of $82,594.81 to Masonville and
$10,000 to an insurance company that
had made partial restitution to the city
for the theft.
Non-cash, skimming, and payroll fraud
The four th most common occupational
fraud scheme in government is non-cash
theft and abuse. This scheme may involve
s te a l i ng i nventor y, suppl ie s , or f i xe d
assets, and may also involve the misuse
of assets or company data for the personal
benefit of the employee. The case of Terry
Lee, David Herre, and Edward Lawson —
all former mechanics employed by the
Depar tment of Public Works in Marion
County, Indiana — provides an example
of non-cash theft. 13 Together, the three
stole and sold scrap metal for personal
gain. Each pleaded guilty to theft, received
a one-year suspended sentence, and was
ordered to provide 80 hours of commu-
nit y ser vice and make rest itut ion to the
cit y of Belmont, Indiana.
The fifth most common occupational
fraud scheme in government is skimming.
This scheme involves the theft of incom-
ing pay ments to an organization by an
employee before the receipts are recorded.
An example of this scheme is seen in the
case of Melissa Ann Arnold, former trea-
surer and tax collector for Spring Garden
Township, York County, Pennsylvania.14
Arnold admitted to stealing more than
$300,000 in taxpayer money. She received
tax-payment checks written out to her as
the township’s tax collector. Instead of
depositing the money into the township’s
bank account, she deposited them into
her own personal account. Arnold received
five years of probation and was ordered
to make restitution. Another example of
skimming involves the case of Shelia Marie
Jerry, a former Deer River, Minnesota city
employee.15 Jerry stole more than $100,000
from the city over a five-year period by
keeping the fees
and p ap er work
for titles on new
automobiles. In a
similar example,
former Michigan
State Police offi-
cer Seth Swanson received a one-year sen-
tence for emb ez z l ing approx im ately
$170,000 by pocketing the $100 fee from
1,701 salvage vehicle inspections.16
The sixth most common occupational
fraud scheme in government is payroll
fraud. This scheme involves an employee
making false claims for compensation,
such as for overtime not worked. A vari-
ation of this scheme involves an employee
stealing paychecks made out to a “ghost”
employee that is either fictitious or a for-
mer employee. Christine King (see previous
discussion about expense reimbursement)
committed pay roll theft as part of her
means of defrauding the city of Masonville,
Iowa. Another example of payroll fraud
involves the case of Tammy Gomillion,
Jill Watkins, and Julie Faye Russell.17 The
three former Neshoba Count y, Missis-
sippi, employees pleaded guilty to embez-
zling $1.3 million over seven years through
claiming fraudulent overtime hours. Each
received a sentence of 25 years with orders
to m a ke res t i t ut ion . G omi l l ion was
employed as a payroll clerk, Watkins as a
bookkeeper, and Russell as a purchasing
clerk. In their respective roles, they col-
luded to commit their embezzlement and
likely did so at a greater amount than any
of them could have done indiv idual ly
b ecause of their col lus ion. This is an
important point because fraud commit-
ted through collusion is typically cost-
lier and takes longer to detect than that
perpetrated by an individual.
Cash on hand theft, check tampering,
and cash larceny
The seventh most common occupational
fraud scheme in government is cash on
hand theft. This scheme involves the theft
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of cash kept on hand by the employer
(such as from a vault or from petty cash).
This scheme is one of three committed
by Amber Ransom, former cit y clerk of
Alburnet, Iowa. 18 Ransom admitted to
taking from petty cash and writing extra
u n au t h o r i z e d p ayc h e c k s t o h e r s e l f
(another example of pay roll fraud). She
also admitted that the cit y paid for per-
sonal items either directly or through a
cit y credit card (two variat ions of the
billing scheme). An audit confirmed that
$102,980 was misappropr iated dur ing
Ransom’s employ ment. She received a
five-year sentence and an order to pay
$37,013 in restitution. In another exam-
ple of petty cash theft that caused a sub-
stant ia l change in a cit y’s operat ions,
several Las Vegas, Nevada city departments
d is cont i nue d m ai nt a i ni ng p e t t y c ash
funds after the conviction of former city
worker Christine Drew, who stole nearly
$8,000 in pett y cash. 19
T he e i g ht h mo s t com mon o cc up a -
t ional f raud scheme in gover nment is
check tampering. Employees commit this
scheme when stealing, forging, or alter-
ing the amount or payee of a check or elec-
tronic payment. This scheme may involve
the theft of blank checks or checks made
out to vendors/employees for legit imate
disbursements, which are then cashed
or d e p o s i te d i n t h e f r au d s te r ’s b a n k
account. This scheme resulted in the fir-
ing of Andreina Santiago, a former cit y
employee of Union Cit y, New Jersey. 20
A police invest igat ion took place when
a pay roll check was found missing from
t h e c i t y ’s C o m mu n i t y D e ve l op m e nt
Agenc y, w here S a nt i ago worke d . T he
check for approximately $1,600 had been
taken from a cubbyhole. A check to a
second employee in the amount of $230
was repor ted missing a few days later.
Police determined that both checks had
been taken by Santiago, who had forged
her coworkers’ signatures and deposited
both into her personal bank account.
The ninth most common occupational
fraud scheme in government is cash lar-
ceny . In this scheme, an employee steals
an incoming pay ment after it has been
recorded by the employer but before it
is deposited in the bank. Because there
is an audit trai l of the cash, this scheme
does not occur as often as skimming (see
#5 in Exhibit 1), but it can still be a threat
to organizat ions. An example of both
cash larceny and skimming can be seen
in the state audit results of Healdton,
Oklahoma.21 Based on a request by the
Healdton Cit y Council, the state audit
found that $79,757.96 had been embez-
z l e d . App rox i m at e l y $ 3 7 , 0 0 0 of t h e
e m b e z z l e m e nt w a s s t o l e n f ro m c a s h
receipts that were recorded but never
deposited. The rest was taken in a check
for cash scheme, which is a type of skim-
ming scheme in which cash in a drawer
is stolen and replaced by an incoming
check. Since the drawer balances, this
t hef t i s d i f f ic u lt to de te c t . T he aud it
noted that the embezzlement stopped
after the Cit y Treasurer Karen Karaleff
had been suspended. Karaleff was later
put on leave and then ter minated for
f a i l i ng to at tend a he ar i ng ab out t he
embezzlement al legat ions.
The costliest of all schemes — Financial
statement fraud
The tenth most common occupational
fraud scheme in government organiza-
t ion is f inancial statement fraud . This
scheme involves t he intent iona l mis-
statement or omission of material infor-
mation from the financial statements or
repor ts of an organizat ion. Some exam-
ples include recording f ic t i t ious rev-
enues or expenses, understating revenues
or expenses, misstat ing asset or liabil-
it y balances, and misstat ing or omitt ing
footnote disclosures. This scheme is typ-
ically referred to as “management fraud”
because execut ive managers t y pica l ly
have the greatest oppor tunit y to perpe-
trate it. However, as seen in the case of
Christ ine King (see previous discussion
about expense reimbursement), a lower-
l e ve l e mpl oye e c a n a l s o com m it t h i s
scheme. As a reminder, King did so by
misrepor t ing bank account balances on
financial repor ts to the cit y council and
Auditor for the State of Iowa to hide her
embezzlement.
As another example of this scheme,
the cit y of Miami, Flor ida was found
liable for securit ies fraud from the sale
of more than $150 million in municipal
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bonds. 22 A lawsuit by the Securit ies and
Exchange Commission alleged that the
city and Michael Boudreaux, former city
budget director, did not tel l credit rat-
ing agencies and investors that money had
been moved between municipal accounts.
The movement was to keep the general
fund above a city-mandated level of $100
million, thereby making the cit y appear
to be more financial ly stable.
As an additional set of comments about
the top 10 occupational fraud schemes
in government, schemes numbered
2 through 9 are categorized as “mis-
appropriat ion of assets.” This cat-
egor y of fraud involves the theft or
misuse of assets, and as seen by the
eight schemes, there are many ways
for employees to do so. Because of
this, misappropriat ion of assets is
commonly referred to as “employee
fraud.” The other two categories of fraud
are those at the top and bottom of the
list — corruption and financial state-
ment fraud. As seen by summing the fre-
q u e n c y p e rc e nt a g e s i n E x h i b i t 1 fo r
schemes numbered 2 through 9, misap-
propriation of assets is the most commonly
occur r ing categor y of fraud, fol lowed
by corruption and then financial state-
ment f raud. This f requenc y of occur-
re n c e i s g e n e r a l l y t r u e re g a rd l e s s of
industr y.
In terms of losses per occurrence, how-
ever, the first and third categories flip,
w ith financial statement fraud costliest,
followed by corruption and then misap-
propriat ion of assets, as show n in the
examples provided in this ar t icle. The
financial statement fraud by the city of
Miami, Florida is the costliest of those
noted, as it involved enticing investors to
pu rch a s e m ore t h a n $ 1 5 0 m i l l i on i n
municipal bonds. B ecause cor r upt ion
t y pical ly involves some level of man-
agement authority or oversight, this cat-
egor y of fraud tends to have a higher cost
per occurrence than misappropriat ion
of assets. This is seen in the bribery exam-
ples provided in this article. One involved
bribes up to $220,000 to secure business
(likely of a far greater amount than the
bribe) while the other case involved a
settlement of more than $4 million. The
one misappropriation of asset example
provided that is comparable in terms of
losses is that of a $1.3 mil lion pay roll
fraud because it involved collusion over
seven years. Understanding the nature
of each scheme discussed and the cate-
gor ies of occupat ional fraud can help
internal auditors comprehend the threats
posed to government organizations.
Tips on fighting occupational fraud in
government
After reading about the top 10 schemes
and examples of each in gover nment,
the quest ion that should natural ly be
asked is: How do internal auditors and
their auditees combat occupational fraud?
To b eg in answer ing this quest ion, we
believe it is first impor tant to note the
ways occupational fraud is most often
detected. Per the 2016 ACFE Report , t ip
(in 39.1 percent of cases), internal audit
(in 16.5 percent of cases), and manage-
ment review (in 13.4 percent of cases)
are the top three methods, result ing in
the detect ion of 69 percent of the cases
covered in the ACFE’s findings. These
three have consistently been the top three
methods in several consecutive biannual
reports published by the ACFE and should
therefore be leveraged to combat occu-
pational fraud. 23
Regarding tips, the ACFE notes that
employees are the most common source
(slightly more than half of al l t ips, w ith
other sources including vendors and cus-
tomers). This finding means that while
s ome employees are def r auding t heir
employers, other employees are tr ying to
help their employers. Employees should
therefore be leveraged to fight occupa-
t ional fraud by government organiza-
t ions for mal ly t raining employees on
how to prevent, detect, and report fraud.
A fraud hotline should also be imple-
mented so anyone (not just employees but
also customers, vendors, and citizens) can
formally repor t suspected fraud. With
the variet y of technolog y available, the
hotline should make use of one or more
communicat ion methods, such as tele-
phone, email, Internet, or mail. The hot-
l i n e s h ou l d b e mon itore d by a p a r t y
independent of the oper at ions of the
government organization, such as inter-
.
INTA-17-05-005-McSwain_INTA Article-R  9/25/17  8:03 PM  Page 10
.
nal audit, law enforcement, or the district
attorney’s office. The fact that internal
audit is one of the primar y sources for
detect ing fraud makes internal auditors
an excel lent choice to receive hot l ine
t ips and then fol low up on suspec ted
f r au d . D oi n g s o s h ou l d on l y f u r t h e r
st reng then inter nal auditors as a pr i-
mar y source for detect ing occupational
fraud.
The third primar y source of occupa-
t ional fraud detect ion is that of man-
a g e m e nt re v i e w. T h e i mp o r t a n c e of
management’s role in combating fraud can-
not be overstated, especial ly when con-
sider ing the pr imar y inter nal cont rol
weaknesses ident if ied by the ACFE in
cases covered in its report. Regardless of
the categor y of fraud (financial state-
ment fraud, corruption, misappropria-
tion of assets), the top five internal control
weaknesses are:
1. lack of internal controls;
2. lack of management review ;
3. override of exist ing internal con-
trols;
4. poor tone at the top; and
5. lack of competent personnel in
oversight roles.
Each of these five weaknesses can be
reduced by management. Internal audi-
tors should explain to managers that it
is management’s responsibility to imple-
ment , oversee , and maint ain inter na l
cont rol . The lack of inter nal cont rols
can be ver y challenging to overcome in
many government organizat ions (espe-
cial ly small ones) because of a lack of
resources to hire enough employees to
al low proper separat ion of duties. For
this reason, management review becomes
even more crucial as a primar y means to
c o m b at f r au d , a n d i nt e r n a l au d i t o r s
should stress this to managers. Internal
auditors should also explain that while
management rev iew pro cedures are a
primar y source for detect ing fraud, this
source can be even stronger because a lack
of management review creates one of the
leading oppor tunit ies to commit fraud.
Internal auditors should keep in mind
that overr iding of internal controls is
mainly a management issue because those
w ith authorit y can “turn off the sw itch”
of inter na l cont rol . Inter na l auditors
should explain to managers that they
need to be cognizant of the tone they
por tray to employees. A loyal manager
c an lead to loya l employees . Inter na l
auditors should also stress to govern-
ment organizat ions that they must be
cognizant of hir ing qualified and com-
petent managers who can project a pos-
it ive and ethical tone and fulfi l l their
duties. Internal auditors should not only
communicate these suggestions to man-
agement, but a lso keep them in mind
w hen per for ming r isk assessments of
auditees. The presence of one or more of
these weaknesses should be strongly fac-
tored in by internal auditors as they judge
how often and to what extent to audit a
government unit, organizat ion, or pro-
gram. Doing so can fur ther strengthen
inter nal audit as a pr imar y s ource of
detect ing occupational fraud.
Besides stronger management review,
we also suggest rotat ing duties among
account ing and finance pers onnel , as
well as requir ing that t ime be taken off
for vacat ion. For example, w hen Rit a
Crundwell took time off to attend horse
show comp et it ions , she cont inue d to
m a i nt a i n cont rol of b a n k s t ate me nt s
while she was away. Only by accident did
a fellow employee receive the bank state-
ment of t he i l leg it imate account t hat
C r u ndwel l cont rol le d . It i s t he re fore
important that fellow employees assume
accounting and finance duties while an
employee has taken time off for work.
Suggestions for fighting
misappropriation of assets schemes
Some schemes discussed in this ar t icle
involved embezzled check disbursements
(billing scheme, expense reimbursement,
pay roll scheme, and check tampering).
It is therefore impor tant to have strong
controls over check disbursements. This
begins w ith having strong physical con-
trols over unused checks (as an aside,
strong physical controls are also essen-
t ial to reduce non-cash theft). This also
means requiring two signatures on checks,
especial ly those for more than a cer tain
amount. One signer should be from out-
side finance and accounting, while the
other can have management responsi-
INTA-17-05-005-McSwain_INTA Article-R  9/25/17  8:03 PM  Page 11
.
bility in finance and accounting (such as
the treasurer), but not record-keeping (such
as the accounts payable clerk). Check-
s i g ners should a ls o rev iew t he do cu-
mentation supporting the disbursement
before signing the check. Check-sign-
ers should know the vendors and employ-
ees of the organizat ion to help detect
bil l ing and pay roll schemes. Bank rec-
onc i l i at ions shou ld b e p e r for me d by
someone who does not make deposits
(thereby helping detect cash larceny) or
h ave c h e c k p ro c e s s i n g a n d s i g n i n g
responsibilit ies. The person performing
the reconciliations should carefully study
bank activ it y for any check tampering.
Additionally, internal auditors should
consider audit ing bank reconciliat ions
for mu lt iple mont hs dur ing t he ye ar.
Internal auditors could also perform cer-
tain t y pes of audits, such as pett y cash,
expense reports, and credit card charges,
on a surprise basis. In each audit, a thor-
ough review of documentat ion should
b e p e r for m e d to e n s u re t h at a l l d i s -
bursements are valid. Internal auditors
should compare the addresses of ven-
dors in the master fi le to the addresses
of employees. Some fraudsters may com-
mit a billing scheme using their own per-
sonal address.
Suggestions for combating corruption
and financial statement fraud
Cor r upt ion is ver y dif f icult to detec t
because those committing this scheme tend
to have management authority and over-
sight that al lows them to override con-
trols and personally take advantage of a
business transaction. This scheme is also
di f f ic u lt to dete c t b e c au s e t he br ib e ,
kickback, or conflict of interest is not eas-
i ly or directly identifiable in the finan-
cial records of the employer. Despite this
difficulty, internal auditors can focus on
cer tain measures to reduce corruption.
Inter nal auditors should make sure
government organizat ions have ethics
policies, covering such topics as the accep-
tance of gifts and presence of conflicts
of interest. Employees should be required
to disclose conflicts of interest on a reg-
ular basis. Internal auditors should advise
government organizations to have a for-
mal, sealed bidding process for specific
contracts. A clear, transparent process
can lead to a reduction in corruption.
Just as certain kinds of audits can reduce
the threat of misappropriation of assets,
specific audits can also reduce corrup-
tion. As corruption is the most common
occupational fraud scheme, internal audi-
tors should perform compliance audits
over policies and procedures dealing with
corruption as well as the bidding process
on contracts. Internal auditors should
also audit vendors to ensure that the best
vendors in terms of quality and cost of
products and services are being provided
to the government organization.
Like corruption, financial statement
fraud is ver y challenging to detect, and
even more so because it involves man-
agers at the top of the organizat ion w ith
fewer eyes looking over their shoulders.
Despite this, internal auditors should be
proact ive w ith helping detect this t y pe
of fraud. Referr ing again to the case of
Rita Crundwell, the external audit firm
that performed the annual audit of Dixon,
Illinois failed to follow up on obvious red
flags that should have caught their atten-
t ion. For example, when the cit y’s bank
completed the external auditor’s account
confirmation requests, the bank added
the i l leg it imate account in its w r itten
responses. Unfor tunately, the external
auditors did not fol low up on this dis-
crepancy — a bank account in the cit y’s
name not showing up in the city’s records.
Dixon’s external auditors also did not
careful ly study fict it ious invoices cre-
ated by Crundwell to hide her embez-
zlement. A comparison of the invoices with
actual invoices from the same vendors
would have identified different invoice
formats, as well as incomplete and inac-
c u r ate i n for m at i on ( i n c lu d i n g t y p o -
graphical errors). Crundwell’s creat ion
of fict it ious invoices ser ves as a perfect
example of another ACFE finding — the
most common method of tr y ing to hide
occupational fraud regardless of fraud
categor y is the creat ion of f raudulent
p hy s i c a l d o c u m e nt s . O t h e r c o m m o n
methods of concealment include:
• alter ing physical documents;
• alter ing transact ions in the
accounting information system;
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• creat ing fraudulent transact ions in
the accounting information system;
and
• destroy ing physical  documents.
Internal auditors should be aware of
these tactics and keep them in mind when
per forming  audit s . Interna l  audi tors
should careful ly study documentat ion
and transactions in the accounting infor-
mation system for inconsistencies. Inter-
nal  auditors  should focus  on unusual
adjust ing of  entries at the end of  the fis-
ca l  year  and entr ies  that  suspiciously
end with “000” or “000,000.” Reflect ing
on the case of  financial  statement fraud
by the city of Miami, Florida, internal audi-
tors should step back and make sure they
understand the business purpose of trans-
actions and that they comply with the poli-
cies and procedures of  the government
unit. A professionally skeptical mindset
i s  needed  to  ensure  t r ansac t ions  are
proper and make sense for the govern-
ment organizat ion’s operat ions.
An old Russian proverb about
professional skepticism
We began this ar t icle by referr ing to the
most  notor ious cit izen of  Dixon, I l l i-
nois, Rita Crundwell, and her unbeliev-
able  embezz lement  of  more  than $53
million. We used her example and those
of  others in this ar t icle to show the very
real threat many government organiza-
t ions face from the many ways fraud is
commonly committed by employees. We
also  prov ide  adv ice  to  ass is t  interna l
auditors in helping government organi-
zat ions combat the schemes discussed.
As we conclude this article, we provide
one last  piece of  adv ice, and it  comes
from Dixon’s most famous cit izen, Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan, who lived in the city
from age 10 unti l  age 22. President Rea-
gan was fond of  quoting a cer tain old
Russ ian proverb when discuss ing  the
ag reed-upon  mutua l  moni tor ing  of
nuclear arsenals to comply with a treaty
between the United States and the Soviet
Union. That proverb is the perfect mantra
for  a l l  internal  auditors : dover yai , no
prover yai , which translates as trust but
ver if y . Keeping these words in mind can
help internal auditors maintain the pro-
fessional skepticism and mindset needed
to help reduce the r isk of  occupational
fraud in government organizat ions. n
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